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The final event in Invisible Man prior to its epilogue is among the novel’s most puzzling 
and cryptic: the narrator dreams that a band of men, led by the communist Brother Jack, castrate 
him and hang the “blood red parts” on a nearby New York area bridge, which suddenly begins to 
walk, “clang[ing] doomfully.”1  This strange episode, often overlooked in readings of the novel, 
becomes difficult to ignore when we consider its position in the narrative, following the hectic 
riot sequence, and implicitly providing the narrator with his final motivation for going 
underground, to the setting of the prologue and epilogue.  The image of castration that leads to 
the sudden animation of the iron bridge seems poised to provide closure to one of the novel’s 
most striking series of motifs, which highlight animation, automatism, and the examined body.  
From the mad veteran’s declaration that the narrator is a “walking zombie … [a] mechanical 
man!” (IM, 94), through a series of electrified and apparently dancing black bodies and 
mechanical automaton dolls, to this perplexing final walking bridge, the novel’s uncanny and 
discomfiting images suggest a persistent underlying concern with the dynamics of automatism 
and perception.  The narrator’s last words to his castrators, “Now let’s see you laugh, scientists!” 
(570, original emphasis) points us toward the set of discourses and social formations against 
which the novel is aimed, but which critical accounts of the novel have only begun to address. 
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The most important scientist to whom the novel responds is arguably Gunnar Myrdal, 
author of the 1944 sociological study, An American Dilemma, which played a key role in what 
has recently been called the “long civil rights era.”  As this period has been recast in recent 
historical accounts by Nikil Pal Singh, Carol Horton, and others, both the general social-
scientific construction of the “Negro Problem” and Myrdal’s study in particular were deeply 
influential in shaping new discourses of racial liberalism for the post-war period. 2  Through 
Ellison’s explicit and sustained responses to Myrdal in Invisible Man, we understand anew that 
the villains of the novel— those with the “peculiar disposition of the eyes” that causes the 
protagonist’s invisibility—are not the overt racists whose potential membership in a lynch mob 
lies just below the surface, but rather the progressive and liberal whites who purport to be anti-
racist, while nonetheless harboring unconscious assumptions about “the Negro” and framing him 
as a problem to be compartmentalized and solved (IM 1).3. Moreover, Ellison’s 1944 review of 
An American Dilemma, when viewed alongside new evidence from Ellison’s manuscripts, 
places the novel’s controversial anti-communism—and Ellison’s related disagreements with 
Richard Wright—under the sign of a more general resistance to a mid-century technocracy that 
would purport to define and solve social problems by manipulating them from afar.   
Ellison accomplishes this critique in the literary register through a series of innovative 
depictions of automata that participate in a key perceptual dilemma: is the object before me a 
conscious and fully human being, or not?  A widely exploited trope in early cinema—from The 
Cabinet of Doctor Caligari and Metropolis to White Zombie and Modern Times—the figure of 
the automaton, mannequin, or robot, and its attendant dilemma, became central to a wide range 
of representations of subhumanity in the twentieth century.  In the wake of developments 
including behaviorist psychology, Taylorist industrial practices, and the advent of mass-mediated 
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propaganda, a new attention to the body and to the malleability and manipulability of behavior 
freighted this figure with political significance.  Particularly with the advent of discourses of the 
“mass man” and of totalitarianism in the early post-War era, the human automaton becomes the 
figurative expression of a margin of a “free” and democratic community.  While the human 
automaton has long been used in the creation of uncanny or comedic effects, Ellison uses the 
figure in an innovative and influential way, satirizing and critiquing the political consequences of 
new scientific discourses that were central to a new approach to racism in the United States.  As I 
will discuss below, Ellison leverages what Stanley Cavell identifies as the ethical dimension of 
this perceptual dilemma of the automaton throughout his major novel.4  This ethics of perception 
has been largely overlooked by the rich exegeses of the text that have focused on the African 
American cultural heritage and linguistic strategies that Ellison also embraces, just as it has been 
by admirable studies that have connected Ellison with a variety of important mid-century 
discourses.5  At stake for this reading of Ellison is how such scientific discourses purport to 
“count” African American voices as part of a democratic community, and yet in fact place those 
voices under erasure.6  By using the figure of the automaton as a narrative break through which 
to open discussions of action and reaction, agency and determinism within the context of the 
“Negro problem,” Ellison exposes several of post-War racial liberalism’s pitfalls, at the same 
time that he sets the terms through which subsequent literary texts represent the possibility of 
resistance in the face of disciplinary institutions, scientific determinism, and disenfranchisement.  
Through readings of Ellison’s essays and manuscripts, as well as the novel’s factory hospital 
scene, depictions of the Brotherhood, and its Sambo doll scene, this article will demonstrate that 
African American automata are a driving force behind Ellison’s satire and perhaps the most 




The narrator of Invisible Man has his closest brush with a scientific approach to race in 
what the novel calls the “factory hospital,” after he has been in a traumatic accident working in 
the paint factory of which the hospital is a part.  He lies strapped to a bed, as the doctors standing 
above him hold a long discussion about his “case” (IM, 235).  While the lab-coated, shock-
administering doctors would seem at first glance to be psychologists, there are several reasons to 
see sociologists as the object of Ellison’s satire in this pivotal scene.  In the discussion, one 
doctor asserts, “it would be more scientific to try to define the case.  It has been developing some 
three hundred years” (IM, 237).  This statement signals that the scientists are not speaking about 
the narrator as an individual, but rather as a product of the historical forces that have conditioned 
and determined him, suggesting the sociological mode of analysis that came to dominate 
discussions of the race question in the mid-century period. Further indicating that sociologists are 
the intended target of Ellison’s satire in this scene, his drafts of the novel have one confused 
character identify the scientists as “socialists, sociolosts, sociologists?  I don’t know.”7  This 
slippage between a setting that belongs to psychology and a discussion that pertains to social 
structures and politics signals that this scene’s satire reaches beyond the now-commonplace jibe 
at the mental institution as a site of normalizing discipline.  This duality in the scene indicates 
that the dynamics of automatism and misinterpretation surrounding the shock treatment contains 
instead a suggestive response to the epistemological limitations of sociology.8 
While the sociology of Robert Park and the Chicago School more generally has been 
discussed at great length with regard to the intersections of race, gender, and sexuality in 
Invisible Man, the most significant sociological text for understanding the novel’s approach to 
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politics, Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, has yet to be fully explored.9  An American 
Dilemma set many of the terms of debate and horizons of success for the civil rights struggle, 
and it was notably the first white-authored study not to attribute a de facto inferiority to African 
Americans. 10 This multi-year study was prompted by the 1935 Harlem riots, 11 which provoked 
the Carnegie Foundation to fund an investigation into the “Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy,” to be led by Myrdal with research assistance from a great many African American 
sociologists and intellectuals.12  Myrdal’s large-scale sociological study pointed out the 
contradictions of life in the Jim Crow South, and the titular dilemma, is in short the contradiction 
between the “creed” of American equality and the racist practices of the segregation era.  The 
resulting book, which was released in 1944, pinned its hopes for change on discerning and 
exposing this contradiction.13   
While Ellison found points worthy of praise in his then-unpublished 1944 review of An 
American Dilemma, he finds in the main that African Americans continue to play the role of the 
object in the study; they are, through the very methods used to confront the problem, denied any 
measure of autonomy or agency in this descriptive text.  According to Ellison, Myrdal concludes 
that “the Negro’s … opinions on the Negro problem are, in the main, to be considered as 
secondary reactions to more primary pressures from the side of the dominant white majority,” 
suggesting that, at best, African Americans’ ideas are a direct and unreflective effect of social 
inequality. 14  This charge is borne out through the study: even as Myrdal troubles to cite a wide 
range of African American intellectuals, including W.E.B. Du Bois, Richard Wright, Ralph 
Bunche, and others, the text gives little credence to what it refers to as “Negro popular theories,” 
defined as “consciously thought-out, though not necessarily logical or accurate system of ideas 
held by a large group of people,” a rubric under which he places the spectrum of African 
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American political positions from NAACP activism to Garveyism.15 
Ellison offers a particularly powerful rejoinder to Myrdal’s statement about political 
ideas as “secondary reactions”:  
but can a people … live and develop for over three hundred years simply by 
reacting?  Are American Negroes simply the creation of white men, or have they 
at least helped to create themselves out of what they found around them?  Men 
have made a way of life in caves and upon cliffs; why cannot Negroes have made 
a life upon the horns of the white man’s dilemma?16 
Ellison’s critique implies that the methods employed by even a sympathetic sociologist like 
Myrdal can fail, in the main, to understand such an important aspect of the problem as more than 
a kind of reaction formation.  His mention here of “making a way of life in caves” suggests that 
this active relationship to one’s environment should be thought of as a human universal. Through 
the absurd image of a “way of life on the horns of the white man’s dilemma,” Ellison suggests 
that the African American’s existence for whites—that is, their reactions to conditions imposed 
by a white power structure—seems to him to constitute the extent of a white sociology’s 
knowledge of the Negro.  
More recent Marxist criticisms of Myrdal have taken a different tack, suggesting a 
different mode of corrective to ideologies of postwar racial liberalism. In Race and the Making 
of American Liberalism, Carol Horton draws attention to the “structural, class-rooted 
developments [that] were simply off the radar screen of the postwar liberal mind.”17  Horton 
claims that “postwar liberalism contained an internal contradiction that would sabotage its 
credibility and potential,” by posing discrimination alone as the main barrier to national 
progress.18  Likewise, Ellison sharply criticizes Myrdal's “running battle with Marxism” and the 
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absence of “class struggle” in the study’s analysis, and he even wonders aloud whether the 
ultimate goal of such a study is the “more efficient exploitation of the natural and human 
resources of the South,” such that the collection of scientific data is a tool of class domination.19  
While the economic and “structural” elements of the race question do not exactly constitute a 
blind spot for Ellison’s review, the novel’s approach to anti-communism leads him to put his 
faith in cultural and creative forms of political action that might be able to bring about new forms 
of recognition for African Americans.  Such recognition functions as a prerequisite, for Ellison, 
to the kinds of structural analysis and redress that Horton rightly deems as urgent and important 
facets of racial politics.   
To illustrate this difference in approach, let us take Ellison’s and Myrdal’s diverging 
interpretations of the zoot suit. Ellison’s well-known discussion of 1940s African American 
dance and fashion memorably prophesizes that, “perhaps the zoot suit conceals profound 
political meaning; perhaps the symmetrical frenzy of the Lindy-hop conceals clues to great 
political power.”20  Myrdal, on the other hand, will bring no such finesse to his interpretation of 
the zoot suit in An American Dilemma, reading it instead as a “misguided attempt to gain status 
by conspicuous consumption,” noting that pieces of “cast-off clothing [from which most zoot 
suits were assembled] may not go well together … [and] may look foolish or odd on Negroes 
because of the different skin color and features” (962-3).  While Ellison may wax a bit lyrical on 
the political significance of the fashion item, Myrdal lets the possibility of such political 
significance pass him by entirely. 
Despite its impassioned and suggestive objections to Myrdal’s methodology, Ellison’s 
review article on Myrdal’s An American Dilemma would not be published until 1964, when it 
was collected in Shadow and Act.  The essay had been rejected from its originally intended 
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venue, the Antioch Review, as what Ellison called “a mess of loose ends,” and it seems, from the 
essay’s somewhat contradictory conclusions, that Ellison had attempted to treat more problems 
than could be addressed adequately in an essay of that length.21  In the light of the essay’s 
rejection—which occurred around the same time Ellison turned toward fiction writing for the 
rest of the decade—it becomes clear that Ellison continues to deal with the same problems in his 
fiction.  Ellison’s critique, in the essay, of the sociological approach to race seems difficult to 
separate, then, from his inclusion of the factory hospital scene in his novel, and particularly the 
scientist’s mention of a “case [that] has been developing for nearly three hundred years” (IM, 
237).  This “three hundred years” echoes provocatively Ellison’s charge to Myrdal in his 
review—“can we develop over three hundred years simply by reacting?”—and it likewise strips 
the narrator of his personal identity by viewing him only in terms of the forces supposed to have 
shaped him.  
This discussion of “reaction” as a limiting epistemological perspective develops a 
critique of a sociological approach to the “Negro Problem” along a path that echoes critiques of 
scientific modernity performed by Ellison’s contemporaries.  While his discussions of scientific 
production as a tool of class domination coincide with the main thesis of Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, he holds perhaps a greater affinity with Martin 
Heidegger.  Heidegger’s critique of modern Western science and philosophy in Being and Time 
holds that both enterprises understand “Being” only as substance, and that to ask the question of 
Being is to recognize different modes of being: in addition to being as substance, there is also the 
being of equipment, and most importantly the being of Dasein, or human existence.  This latter is 
the site of culture (what Heidegger calls inhabiting a “world”), of anxiety and care, and of inter-
subjective connection.22  In his seminal essay on scientific modernity, “The Age of the World-
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Picture,” Heidegger argues that the assumption that the world can be measured as substance 
alone has dominated the worldview of our era, an observation that proves particularly relevant to 
scientific projects like Myrdal’s.  The project of science, for Heidegger, is to create and 
manipulate an ever-more-accurate picture of the world as substance: the ideal of science is to 
“set up nature to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance.”23  To be 
“calculable in advance” is to be treated as a simple substance, and Ellison’s essay on Myrdal 
seems to make precisely this point, that it is only something sub-human that would simply 
react.24  While scientific studies proved to great advantage in court cases like Brown vs. Board, 
they could also have negative effects.  The observation and prediction of behaviors (as in 
behaviorist psychology), the statistical analysis of the relationships between family structure, 
income, and mental illness, and overly deterministic views of the shaping power of institutions, 
all contribute to a reductive vision of the subjects under question, what Mark Seltzer has 
provocatively called “statistical persons.”25  Likewise, the narrator, as a “case that has been 
developing three hundred years,” is not a democratic subject, but rather an object to be measured 
from a distance, a problem to be solved through the one-sided administration of a cure.   
The factory hospital scene in Invisible Man will ultimately condense the dynamic of 
action and reaction discussed in the American Dilemma review into an examination of the 
protagonist’s body under jolts of electricity.  When the scientists in the factory hospital 
ultimately give the narrator the shock treatment, they identify his jitters and hops along with the 
electric current as dancing.  “Get hot,” they tell him, saying, “they really do have rhythm, don’t 
they?” (IM, 237).  This moment plays within a similar scene of interpretation, as these scientists 
pretend to postulate a cultural observation, in the form of a stereotype, in what ought only to be a 
physiological reaction to the electric current.  The exclamation, “they really do have rhythm,” 
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ties a caricature of the narrator’s culture to a physiological reaction, and the scientists in the 
factory hospital inhabit the same short-circuit through which African American culture and 
political views can be understood as pathologies (IM, 237).  This pattern of simple action and 
reaction bears comparison to the automaton bank the narrator finds later in the novel.26  He 
describes its operation: “if a coin is placed in the hand and a lever pressed upon the back, it will 
raise its arm and flip the coin into the grinning mouth” (IM, 319).  By making the narrator dance 
at the flip of a switch, the ECT-administering doctors are using the narrator’s shock treatment for 
entertainment in the same way a child might use such a bank for a moment of laughter.27  That 
this application of electricity causes laughter in the doctors and likely a feeling of mild horror in 
the reader recalls an earlier disagreement between Henri Bergson and Sigmund Freud about how 
we perceive automata.  Freud pointed to realistic automata as a source of the feeling of the 
“uncanny,” while Bergson identified humans’ resemblance to machines the wellspring of all 
comedy.  This disagreement points to a deep-seated confusion that automata provoke, when the 
decision to treat something as a person or as a thing carries profound ethical consequences.  That 
the doctors do not count the narrator as fully human amplifies, in the register of satire, Ellison’s 
critique of Myrdal.  
With the factory hospital scene, as Ellison chose to shape his fiction, the treatment seems 
not, ultimately, to have the effect those scientists desired, namely that “society [should] suffer no 
traumata on his account” (IM, 236).  The narrator becomes, in spite of the treatment, something 
of a troublemaker for the rest of the novel; rather than being calmed and neutralized, put happily 
out of sight and mind from a white America that might wish him out of existence. The lasting 
consequence of this scene, for the purpose of the novel’s plot, is that the narrator forgets his 





A strong continuity holds between Ellison’s figurations of automata in his critiques of 
scientific management of the race question and the metaphors that surround his participation in a 
“scientific” communist party, one that suggests a re-framing of current debates about the novel’s 
anti-communism. In asserting that the main object of critique is the party’s scientism, Ellison’s 
anti-communism itself takes on a less important role in our understanding of the novel.28  
Ellison’s habit of continuing to favor Marxist modes of analysis, even after his break with the 
Communist Party in 1943, shares more in common with the post-War Trotskyites like David 
Bell, Norman Mailer, and Irving Howe, whom Andrew Ross characterizes as “protective of what 
they saw as the privilege of artistic ‘freedom’ over and against political ‘discipline,’ 
temperamentally unsuited to the steadily committed life of the organized ‘professional 
revolutionary.’”29  The drafts of Invisible Man suggest, however, that whatever Ellison’s 
“temperament,” he wanted to radically alter the Communist Party’s approach to political change, 
an approach that had been tainted by a technocratic ideology that elsewhere pervaded the culture 
of the 1940s and 1950s.   
In the decade following World War II, intellectuals who defined American identity 
against the concept of “totalitarianism” often figured the scientific state control of society as the 
primary link between a eugenic fascism and a scientifically Marxist communism.30 The 
successful implementation of wartime cinematic propaganda, in the U.S. and Nazi Germany, and 
the popularity of novels like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s 1984 in 
the United States, all made Americans newly anxious about the prospect of what Theodor 
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Adorno would call the “the administered world,” and the automaton would later become the 
cinematic and literary focal point for this anxiety, in films such as Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers. 31  Ellison’s automata, however, would focus this image not on the question of an 
inscrutable Communist Other, but on the Other which the African American would present to the 
white American expert. 
 Invisible Man depicts its protagonist’s initiation into the Brotherhood as a process of 
learning a “scientific terminology” and “speaking as a scientist” (IM, 306).  Even the 
Brotherhood’s abandonment of the Harlem district is deemed a “scientific necessity,” and the 
novel makes around two dozen other mentions of science and scientists in connection with the 
Brotherhood (IM, 503). At the moment of his greatest infatuation with the Brotherhood, the 
narrator describes the situation:  
The world was strange if you stopped to think about it; still it was a world that 
could be controlled by science, and the Brotherhood had both science and history 
under control. […] The organization had given the world a new shape, and me a 
vital role.  We recognized no loose ends, everything could be controlled by our 
science. Life was all pattern and discipline; and the beauty of discipline is when it 
works.” (IM 382)   
This encapsulation of the party line presents the narrator’s embrace of the party as tied closely to 
control, mastery, and objective certainty: “everything could be controlled by our science.”  
Indeed, the Brotherhood, in introducing the narrator to Marxism, tells him to forget his 
economics and his sociology that he learned at the university; not because, as the narrator might 
hope, he will not need them any more, but because the party’s Marxism provides an even more 
precise, and more complete, objective picture of the world (IM, 305).  Taken together with the 
13 
infatuation with discipline, the narrator’s participation in the party, as “pattern and discipline,” 
takes on an automatic quality: it becomes another mode of objectification, and the party’s 
potential for collective action is undermined by a hierarchical, secretive, and capricious 
managing class. 
Of course, anxiety about party discipline would indeed have tapped into a large set of 
anxieties in the post-War U.S.: the dialectic between behaviorist and deterministic theories of the 
self and representations of totalitarian others as automata was, at this point, reaching a point of 
crisis.  Andrew Hoberek has astutely noted that Ellison’s Brotherhood would also have tapped 
into the cultural discourse of the “organization man,” an anxiety of the newly enlarged post-
World War II professional-managerial class.32  This anti-conformity discourse arguably became 
one of the defining features of the literature of the 1950s, and a very strong point of continuity 
with the literatures of the 1960s, which often expressed similar sentiments about conformity in 
more outrageous ways.  Surely, discourses about totalitarianism, particularly Hannah Arendt’s 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, played some role in the wide spread of the anti-conformity 
discourse in the 1950s.  Even before the Eichmann trial and Arendt’s own later declaration of the 
“banality of evil” in 1963, earlier discourses on mob psychology (for example, Gustave Le Bon’s 
The Crowd and Georg Simmel’s The Metropolis and Mental Life) gave way to analyses of the 
conformist individual who would follow the crowd, such as Erich Fromm’s 1941 Flight from 
Freedom.  Numerous discourses of American identity in the 1950s bear the marks of this new 
international situation, and we can read the “organization man” discourse as actively excluding 
the aspects of American culture that might be seen to resemble the mob psychology and the 
perceived conformity that made German fascism possible.  In this sense, Invisible Man partakes 
in both the “organization man” discourse as well as the new anti-fascist and anti-communist 
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sentiment in the U.S. at the time.  All three of these contexts are evoked in the dramatic irony of 
the narrator’s infatuation with discipline and in the Brotherhood’s instrumental treatment of the 
protagonist.     
This connection with an “organization man” discourse, while convincing through much 
of the novel, loses some of its explanatory power when the Brotherhood’s discussions turn to the 
question of race.  A professed anti-racism is central to Brother Jack’s character in the novel, and 
this anti-racism draws the narrator toward the party’s “real democracy.”33 When, for instance, the 
Brothers ask the narrator to sing, because they say, “all colored people can sing,” Jack attempts 
to silence them and becomes angry at the instance of stereotyping (IM, 312).  This moment 
marks Ellison’s satire of him as an explicitly anti-racist avatar of a new racial liberalism, even 
though the narrator will at one point attempt to reduce Jack to the other white racist figures he 
encounters (when he suggests sardonically that he be called “Marse Jack” [IM, 473]).  When the 
Brotherhood “sacrifices” the Harlem district, inciting and then abandoning a riot, the narrator 
sees a problem that persists despite this professed anti-racism: he asks, “what did [the 
Brotherhood] know of us [African Americans in Harlem], except that we numbered so many, 
worked on certain jobs, offered so many votes, and provided so many marchers for some protest 
parade of theirs?” (IM, 507).  In this moment, the party’s instrumental treatment of the Harlem 
district—as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself—takes the form of the count, and they 
are numbered only as manipulable bodies.  Suggesting Heidegger’s notion of a “world-picture,” 
the narrator claims the Brotherhood was “all a swindle, an obscene swindle!  They had set 
themselves up to describe the world,” which is to say that they had cultivated an objective 
distance from history in order to try to manipulate it in a “scientific” manner (IM, 507).   
The final scene before the epilogue, in fact, continues this association between the 
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sociologists’ scientism, the Brotherhood, and the narrator’s automatism.  The fact that it is a 
dream sequence, following the narrator’s escape from the riot, seems to allow for the inclusion of 
an even stranger portrayal of the relationship between man, scientist, and automatism, than has 
been allowed elsewhere in the novel.  In a clear parallel with the scene in the factory hospital, the 
narrator finds himself prostrate, surrounded by men standing over him—this time, the main 
characters from his past, including Jack, Norton, Tobitt, Ras, and Bledsoe, rather than just the 
psychiatrists.  In the dream, the men castrate him, fulfilling the suggested prescription of one of 
the doctors in the factory hospital scene midway through the novel.  Jack asks the narrator how it 
feels “to be free of one’s illusions,” and the narrator sees his “blood-red parts” hanging in the 
arch of a high, metal bridge (IM, 569).  As he points to the bloody spectacle, he tells them, “there 
hang not only my generations wasting upon the water [but] your universe, and that drip-drop 
upon the water is all the history you’ve made… Now laugh, you scientists.  Let’s hear you 
laugh!” (IM, 570).  His insistence that these men are “scientists” cements the connection, in the 
novel’s fabric of repeated motifs, between the science of the psychiatrists and that of the 
Brotherhood.  In the image cited above, the bridge from which the narrator’s genitals hang 
begins to walk, “striding like a robot, an iron man, whose iron legs clanged doomfully as it 
moved” (IM, 570).  As a dream of castration anxiety, it may suggest that the narrator’s fear is 
particularly well founded, sinc the whites in the novel ascribe an unrealistic power or life force to 
the African American phallus.  The suggestive image of the giant robot might also convey a 
mood of totalitarian horror, wherein the version of the narrator that the scientists create is also an 
ominous, inhuman, and destructive monstrosity. 
The political consequences of the party’s objectification of African Americans are most 
strongly expressed in a conversation between Jack and the narrator that would be cut from the 
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final version of the novel: 
“Look” I said, “but aren’t my people part of history?” 
“Yes and no,” [Jack] said.  ”A people may exist during a historical period and 
still not be of that period, just as the Indians are still with us but not a part of 
present day historical movements. […] They must be able to effectively accept or 
reject the basic issues of its time, and thus it must learn to act.”  
“But don’t we act?” I said.   
“Yes, but not always historically, “ he said eagerly, “I refer to decisive action.  
Perhaps it would be more correct to say that the Negro people react rather than 
act—insofar as they express themselves after those events which profoundly 
[affect] their destiny have occurred.34 
This portion of the conversation between Jack and the narrator may ultimately have been deleted 
for its similarity to what has become one of the most widely-cited passages in Black Boy, 
Richard Wright’s statement that African Americans “lived somehow in [Western civilization] 
but not of it.”35 In Wright’s powerful turn of phrase, the semantic difference between being “in” 
and “of” Western civilization signals a mode of alienation, or even of double consciousness, the 
modifier “somehow” carrying the weight of the senselessness of history.  In this passage, 
however, the difference between being “in” and “of” history is in the final analysis an 
epistemological difference between ways of seeing and understanding history.  Ellison here 
poses the question of whether agency is an effect of our ways of seeing: seeing someone as 
“existing during” rather than “being of” a period is a judgment about whether those people have 
access to forms of power, naturally, but it is also a judgment about where to look for agency.  
Where an old-fashioned history of “great men” has many times undergone criticism for 
17 
overlooking the role of social movements, one would likely point precisely to a Marxist history 
for a lens through which we would “see” a much wider variety of forms of historical agency and 
collective action. 36  It would seem, then, that it is an overly rigid definition of an organized 
proletarian class that restricts the Brotherhood’s understanding of African American agency.  
This scientific understanding of historical agency can give us a stronger purchase on the meaning 
of the novel’s repeated mention of “plunging outside history” (IM, 377).  The “history” outside 
of which the protagonist plunges is, in the light of this context, clearly the insistently scientific 
history of a prognosticating dialectical materialism.  Moreover, this quotation provides another 
deep point of continuity between Ellison’s critique of the social sciences discussed in 
conjunction with the novel’s factory hospital scene.  Ellison’s then-unpublished review of 
Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma becomes, in this fragment, the basis for the novel’s 
critique of the Brotherhood.  Here, it is the distinction between “acting” and “reacting” that 
echoes strongly with the language of that review, which shows that, in Ellison’s understanding, it 
is both the sociologists like Myrdal, as well as the Communist Party, whose limited grasp of 
African American culture causes them to perceive and represent African Americans as passive 
bystanders in history, rather than as different kinds of historical agents.  
It is this dynamic of interpretation and historical agency that frames the novel’s central 
figuration of automatism, the Sambo doll scene.  This scene takes place on the street corner, 
where the narrator encounters his former colleague in the Brotherhood, Tod Clifton, selling 
paper and cardboard bouncing dolls called “boogie woogie Sambo.”  After the narrator 
recognizes Clifton and tries to approach him, his unlicensed operation happens to be raided by 
the police, and Clifton is shot after he resists arrest.  This suggestive and widely cited scene has 
been remarked upon for the eerie reciprocal relationship between Clifton and his doll: like the 
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doll, Clifton bounces with his legs, and his face and arms remain stiff, and his staring eyes do not 
recognize his friend as he makes a repetitive and outlandish sales pitch for the dolls.  Previous 
readings of the scene have noted how the novel uses this uncanny moment to complicate the 
relationship between African Americans and objects (through a compelling illustration of the 
Marxian concept of reification), and as a representation of African American “animatedness,” 
but neither of these readings satisfactorily address the scene’s function for the plot or its wider 
significance for the novel.37 
Clifton’s importance in the earlier scenes of the novel has to do with his susceptibility to 
other ideologies.  Ras the Exhorter, the novel’s parodically reductive representative of black 
nationalism, seeks out Clifton, and his susceptibility to Ras’s seduction takes the form of a 
locked gaze: after a dose of rhetoric from Ras, “Clifton looked at Ras with a tight, fascinated 
expression, pulling away from [the narrator]” (IM, 372).  The possibility that Clifton could be 
swayed so easily from a party Marxist position to a Black Nationalist one, then, evokes a 
totalitarian conformity, the possibility of becoming a mass man.  Later, by selling these dolls in 
the street, Clifton participates in his own denigration in a profoundly unsettling way, suggesting 
that he might be susceptible to any kind of mental manipulation. 
It is after the encounter with Ras that Clifton suggests that he might need to “plunge 
outside of history” and the Sambo doll episode takes on an explicitly political valence when the 
narrator reconsiders this earlier statement (IM, 377).  He judges that Clifton had “fallen outside 
of history,” but is made uneasy, thinking Clifton “knew that only in the Brotherhood could we 
make ourselves known, could we avoid being empty Sambo dolls” (IM, 434).   This metaphor of 
emptiness suggests that the narrator believes what Jack has said about agency at this point: that 
only within the white-organized proletarian class can African Americans act “historically.”38 
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When the narrator encounters Clifton selling Sambo dolls on the street, he finds a 
dilemma in which he suspects that Clifton has, indeed, ceased being a rational agent, and the 
passages in which this encounter is described produces a singular and strange effect. Between the 
narrator, the doll, and Clifton, it seems as though the doll’s automatic movements infect the other 
two characters.  First, the narrator describes the Sambo,  
a grinning doll of orange-and-black tissue paper … [that moved] up and down in a 
loose-jointed, shoulder-shaking, infuriatingly sensuous motion, a dance that was 
completely detached from the black, mask-like face. […] I saw the tip of the 
spieler’s toes press upon the circular cardboard that formed the feet and a broad 
black hand come down, its fingers deftly lifting the doll’s head and stretching it 
upward … then releasing it to dance again.  And suddenly the voice [of the 
salesman’s spiel] didn’t go with the hand.  […] It was Clifton, riding easily back 
and forth in his knees, flexing his legs without shifting his feet, his right shoulder 
raised at an angle and his arm pointing stiffly at the bouncing doll as he spieled 
from the corner of his mouth. (IM, 431-2)  
Sianne Ngai has discussed how, in the language of this passage, Clifton and the doll are co-
implicated in the doll’s movement, such that “the human agent anthropomorphizes the puppet ... 
but the puppet also mechanizes the human.”39  This contrast, the detachment, between the easy 
and “sensuous” rocking of both figures simultaneously, and the stiffness of their expressions, 
signals that either Clifton is imitating the doll or that in playing the part of the spieling salesman 
he enacts a form of entertainment much like that of the doll itself.  The narrator, in the moment 
of recognizing Clifton, describes himself as “paralyzed” before he moves to spit on the bouncing 
doll (IM, 432).  This is clearly an uncanny moment, the similarity between Clifton and his 
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Sambo doll’s movements producing an uncomfortable confusion.  To call once again upon 
Bergson’s interpretation of the automaton, it seems particularly strange that the Sambo doll 
should produce such a great deal of laughter in this scene: “He’ll keep you entertained.  He’ll 
make you weep sweet—/ Tears from laughing,” claims Clifton, and the crowd around Clifton 
continues laughing throughout the entire scene (IM, 432, original emphasis).  The laughter is 
perhaps the scene’s most non-sensical element—it seems difficult to imagine that a cardboard 
doll, even if it does move “as though it receive[s] a perverse pleasure from its motions,” could 
captivate a crowd so completely (IM, 431).  Rather, it is the proximity between Clifton’s 
movements and that of the Sambo doll that gives the viewers the impression that the seller and 
the product are two halves of an entertaining vaudeville act.  When the narrator spits on the doll, 
his attempt to refuse the spectacle actually implicates him in it, as he sees “a short pot-bellied 
man look down [at the doll], then up at me with amazement and explode with laughter, pointing 
from me to the doll” (IM, 433).  The man apparently laughs because he supposes the narrator 
would be dim-witted enough to mistake the Sambo doll for another black man, as in the stock 
situation of comedy routines that can be traced back to Joel Chandler Harris’s “Wonderful Tar-
Baby” story.  The difference, however, between the Tar-Baby and the Sambo doll scene, is that 
the latter is both a comic and tragic encounter with a sham interlocutor: for the white man who 
explodes with laughter, the scene is a comic one, but the scene’s uncanny force “paralyze[s]” the 
narrator, and ultimately ends in Clifton’s death.   
The episodes with Clifton highlight the ethical dimension to Ellison’s critique of Myrdal 
and the factory hospital scientists, particularly when Clifton’s death sets in motion the novel’s 
final events, including the narrator’s break from the scientific Brotherhood.  In what is perhaps 
the central ethical gesture of the novel, the narrator publicly mourns Clifton and defends his 
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actions against the Brotherhood, who call Clifton a “traitor” (IM, 467). The Brotherhood has 
used Clifton as a means to an end, discarding him when he is no longer valuable; by contrast, the 
narrator defends Clifton as “a man and a Negro; a man and brother [even though he was] jam-
full of contradictions” (IM, 467).  In the moment when the narrator finds Clifton on the corner, 
he spits on one of the dolls to signify his disapproval of Clifton’s actions, but he nevertheless 
insists on trying to reach Clifton, even though he had apparently lost his conscious autonomy and 
refused to return his gaze.  Despite his uncertainty regarding the humanity of his former friend, 
the narrator makes a leap of faith in pursuing him and in defending his proper burial.  As with the 
novel’s other interpretive dilemmas involving automatism, an act of acknowledgement across a 
gulf of uncertainty becomes the pivotal ethical gesture.   
Unlike the factory hospital scientists, who were content to treat the narrator as a machine 
unworthy of ethical obligation, the narrator here offers acknowledgment despite his uncertainty 
about Clifton. That this acknowledgment brings about the final break from the scientific 
Brotherhood can remind us again of the general tenor of the narrator’s party involvement.  The 
main source of tension in this involvement is that, in a series of tests and orations, the narrator is 
not sufficiently “scientific,” or “theoretical” in his approach—in his final argument with the 
Brothers, they call him, sarcastically, a “great tactician” and “quite a theoretician” (IM, 464, 
469).  His job, the Brotherhood tells him in this final argument, is to “keep repeating the last 
thing we told you to say,” suggesting that, as an organization man, he is acknowledged as an 
object, and as a tool, but not as a rational individual capable of thought and action (IM, 470).    
 
III. 
In order to delineate the alternatives that Ellison’s novel suggests to this mid-century 
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scientism, let us return to the typescript’s dialogue between the narrator and Brother Jack.  
Where Brother Jack states that “the Negro people react rather than act,” we find that this excised 
conversation provides the proper context for a frequently cited moment in the novel’s riot scene, 
in which the narrators sees Harlem’s poor burning their tenement buildings.  The narrator 
declares that, despite what the Brotherhood has claimed, these Harlem residents are “capable of 
their own action” (IM, 548).  It is ultimately in the capability for action and in creative political 
gestures that Ellison’s novel finds hope, in a small set of affirmative answers to the novel’s well-
known question, “can politics ever be an expression of love?” (IM, 452).  The liberation from the 
tenement buildings in the riot, as well as the narrator’s musings on the zoot suiters—“who knew 
but that they were the saviors, the true leaders, the bearers of something precious?”—are two 
well-rehearsed examples of this creative expression (IM, 441).  Less often noted, however, is the 
anti-eviction parade that the narrator puts on early in the novel, in which he employs a kind of 
dancing or step team, the “Hot Foot Squad,” which delights the crowd and “dumbfounds” the 
police, a mood of protest that anticipates the creative political culture of the 1960s (IM, 380).40  
On the level of the novel’s language, there is for instance the exchange between the black vet and 
the white donor Norton in the Golden Day bar, in which the vet had been “trying to change some 
blood into money,” and the vet “discovered it and John D. Rockefeller stole the formula from 
[him],” a brilliant mix of Marxian thought about the nature of labor, a celebratory nod to Charles 
Drew (the African American inventor of blood plasma), and a veiled criticism of white 
philanthropy’s agendas, as Rockefeller had been one of Booker T. Washington’s benefactors 
(IM, 81).  In addition to the novel’s language and reported actions like the parade, the novel 
ultimately showcases the narrator’s talent as an orator as a source of creative political action.  
This oratorical skill, which leads to his underground hibernation and the scene from which he 
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writes, is not far removed from the form of the novel itself as a form of creative politics: the 
dialectical structure of the fiction is itself a testament to the paradox, contradiction and depth of 
experience which remain invisible to the scientific gaze. 
 In closing, I want to revisit the question of an ethics of acknowledgment, whose 
dilemmas Ellison so consistently figures through the specter of automatism in the novel, through 
Ellison’s 1953 National Book Award acceptance speech, where he claims the novel attempts to 
return to “the mood of personal moral responsibility for democracy.”41  This seems like a 
somewhat conservative statement on the face of it; it might be read, in the light of his disavowals 
of Wright’s “narrow naturalism” later in the same speech, with an emphasis on personal 
responsibility, a rejection of rhetorics of damage or blame.  Yet the question of a responsibility 
for democracy—particularly if we shift from the local and customary register of the “moral” 
toward the more generalizable “ethical” register—might persuade us to read the text as an 
exploration of what that responsibility might mean, and of how an individual or a collective 
might embrace it.  An ethical responsibility for democracy would be precisely what the present 
essay has attempted to explicate relative to Ellison’s novel: that an acknowledgment of others as 
rational and capable political agents must be the sine qua non of democracy.  This is the 
acknowledgment withheld in the scientific management and legal disenfranchisement of an 
African American population, and in a scientific communist party’s instrumental treatment of a 
community, even as perpetrated by staunchly anti-racist individuals.  This acknowledgment, 
moreover, is not a mystical or elusive element: it consists in acting as if a particular subject is 
capable of playing an active role relative to his or her surroundings.  Ellison’s novel brings out 
the dynamics of this acknowledgment through the parodically reductive image of the African 
American automaton, urging the reader to recognize anew the complexity and irreducibility of 
24 
human experience. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (New York: Vintage, 1952), 570.  Further references are to this 
edition and are cited parenthetically in the text as IM. 
2 Nikil Pal Singh, Black is a Country (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 2004), Carol Horton, Race 
and the Making of American Liberalism (New York: Oxford U P, 2005), and related projects 
including David Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black-White Relations: The Use and Abuse of An 
American Dilemma, 1944–1969 (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU P, 1987), Daryl Scott, Contempt and 
Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996 (Chapel Hill: UNC 
P, 1997). 
3 The role of sociology is central to Ellison’s own explanations of the novel, as well, as his 1981 
introduction to the novel calls “invisibility” a play on the “pseudo-scientific concept [of] ‘high 
visibility’”(IM, xv).  The “’high visibility’ [that] actually rendered one un-visible” (IM, xv, 
original emphasis), has also been discussed with regard to black masculinity in Daniel Y. Kim, 
Writing Manhood in Black and Yellow: Ralph Ellison, Frank Chin, and the Literary Politics of 
Identity (Stanford, CA: Stanford U P: 2005), 66-82.  Related discussions of the intertwining of 
black masculinity and the enterprise of sociology can be found in Marlon Ross, Manning the 
Race: Reforming Black Men in the Jim Crow Era (New York: NYU P, 2004), 244–5, 145–191, 
and “Chapter One of Booker T. Washington’s Up From Slavery and the Feminization of the 
African American Male” in Representing Black Men, Marcellus Blount and George P. 
Cunningham, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1996), 95–110, and Wahneema Lubiano, “But 
Compared to What? Reading Realism, Representation, and Essentialism in School Daze, Do the 
Right Thing, and the Spike Lee Discourse,” in Representing Black Men, 173–204, esp.185.  
4 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New 
York: Oxford U P, 1979), 403–418.  For Cavell, the ethical gesture of “acknowledgment” is 
prior to all forms of scientific and philosophical knowledge. A similar assumption grounds 
Ellison’s attempt to undermines forms of white scientific knowledge about African Americans 
that explicitly withhold such acknowledgment. 
5Such critical accounts include, of course, Houston Baker’s Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American 
Literature and Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s The Signifying Monkey, as well as contextualizations 
within the post-War culture of anti-communism (Barbara Foley), the organization man (Andrew 
Hoberek, discussed below), and post-War intellectuals (Jerry Gafio Watts and Kenneth Warren).  
My work also builds on, though ultimately disagrees with, other recent work that has paid 
attention to the novels automata. Sianne Ngai suggests in a brief reading of the Sambo doll scene 
(discussed below) that the representation of automata is related to a crisis of agency associated 
with African American “animatedness … a representation of the African American … as 
excessively ‘lively’ and a pliant body” (12).  Bill Brown, whose work I also discuss below, has 
read some of the novel’s scenes with automata as part of a longer discussion of racist objects and 
memorabilia. 
6 I understand Ellison’s thinking about how African Americans do or do not “count” as part of a 
democratic community through Jacques Rancière’s writings.  He posits that reorganizing the 
count of citizens is the fundamental gesture of democratization: “political dispute is distinct from 
all conflicts of interest between constituted parties of the population, for it is a conflict over the 
very count of those parties.  It is not a discussion between partners but an interlocution that 
undermines the very situation of the discussion” (100).  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics 
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and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: U of MN P, 1999).   
7 Papers of Ralph Waldo Ellison, Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C., box 146, folder 13.  This folder was retyped in 1949, suggesting that this phrase was cut 
relatively late in the writing process.  Aside from being a somewhat feeble pun, this utterance 
may have been excised because it is spoken in this draft by an earlier incarnation of the character 
“Mary,” who will be cast in a different role in the final version of the novel.  In this version, she 
is a kindly janitor who aids the narrator in escaping the factory hospital.   
8 By the time he would write Invisible Man, Ellison had already incorporated what is now a 
commonplace mode of satirical asylum imagery into his fiction, using the figure of the 
straitjacket-toting guards as lackeys of the racist power structure in his 1944 short story, “Flying 
Home”: these guards have the power to declare a well-to-do African American fighter pilot 
“insane” for reaching above his “natural” position.  A similar satirical mode is taken up again in 
Invisible Man, when the dean of the Negro college, Bledsoe, has a war veteran shipped away to 
another mental institution after speaking too freely to the white philanthropist Norton (IM, 151–
2).  In this moment, Ellison combines the notion of the mental institution as a space of 
containment for radical or outrageous ideas with a critique of the black bourgeoisie, embodied in 
Bledsoe, as the social group guilty of such silencing.  Nevertheless, the novel’s factory hospital 
scene seems not to fit within even this transposed version of the familiar Foucauldian critique of 
mental institutions.  Rather, despite the presence of electroconvulsive therapy as an instance of 
institutional violence, the “case” that has been developing for “three hundred years” demands a 
critical frame capable of understanding the reach of sociology’s implications, comprising deeper 
questions about the act of scientific interpretation. 
9 See Kim, 47 and Roderick Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2004), 71–6.  Ferguson uncovers from Ellison’s papers a 
discarded chapter of Invisible Man that utilizes Robert Park’s infamous statement, “The Negro is 
the lady of the races,” and analyzes the gender politics of the Trueblood scene in the light of 
John Dollard’s Caste and Class in a Southern Town, a sociological study in the Chicago 
tradition.  Stephen Schryer, “Fantasies of the New Class: Ideologies of Professionalism in Post-
World War II American Fiction,” (Diss. Univ. of California at Irvine, 2007) discusses Ellison’s 
engagement with Myrdal more centrally, but claims that, as a member of a new professional-
managerial class, Ellison is closer to Myrdal than he realizes.   
10 Nikhil Pal Singh calls An American Dilemma “the landmark reference work for the long civil 
rights era” (142).  He argues that An American Dilemma is particularly important for its 
articulation of the international significance of Jim Crow: “In the final analysis, what made An 
American Dilemma such an influential document was its presentation of ‘the Negro problem’ as 
the symbolic pivot on which future claims to [the] U.S. global mission rested” (148).   
11 Singh, 134.  Although Myrdal himself had great hopes that his study would help to bring about 
racial justice in the U.S., the fact that riot control forms part of the project’s original impetus 
adds another layer of significance to the riot scene in Ellison’s novel.   
12 The question of Ellison’s own position relative to African American sociology is a complex 
one, in part because he mostly avoids direct engagements with them, perhaps out of politeness or 
a fear of alienating himself from the community of prominent African American intellectuals.  
Rampersad notes that Ellison sent courtesy copies of Invisible Man as a way to fuel “special 
rivalries,” and this list included both Richard Wright and the prominent black sociologist Horace 
Cayton (259).   On a conceptual level, Ellison might have agreed with Marlon Ross’ assessments 
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in Manning the Race that African American sociologists “used urban ethnography to construct 
their own masculinity as normal, their sexuality as self-disciplined, and their social status as 
professional—that of men deserving managerial responsibility for the black urban mass” (147).  I 
see Ellison’s humanism as drawing on a tradition of African American definitions of cultural 
analysis as distinct from scientific analysis, including Du Bois’s own statement, preceding his 
musicological analyses in “The Sorrow Songs,” that “so woefully unorganized is sociological 
knowledge that the meaning of progress … and the limits of human perfectability, are veiled, 
unanswered sphinxes on the shores of science” in The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2007), 192.  Likewise, Alain Locke opens his essay “The New Negro” with the 
claim that the titular character of his essay has remained invisible to the “watch and guard of 
statistics” kept by the “Sociologist, the Philanthropist, [and] the Race Leader” in The New 
Negro: An Interpretation (New York: Boni, 1925), 3.  We might also look toTake Du Bois’ oft-
quoted line from The Souls of Black Folk: “while sociologists gleefully count his bastards and 
his prostitutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating black man is darkened by the shadow of a 
vast despair” (42).,”  which It introduces a useful distinction between the object of the count (the 
bastard) and the “very soul” which it neglects, a distinction that Ellison uses in his depiction of 
the Brotherhood.   (42).  In this line of thinking, one might argue that Ellison’s disavowal of 
sociological knowledge (which he would likely have associated with Wright), can be seen as an 
enabling condition for his faith in the promise of cultural analysis and action. 
13 See Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of 
Experts, (Berkeley: U of CA P, 1995), 182.  Herman claims that Adorno’s text is the first to 
focus on the question of prejudice as “determined by deep psychic structures,” a model that 
Myrdal embraces.  As for the efficacy of this method I would argue that Ellison, like Horton, 
rejects outright Myrdal’s belief that exposing the contradiction of the Jim Crow practice with the 
ideal of the “American creed” will be, in itself, all that is needed to solve the “Negro problem.”   
14 Ellison, “An American Dilemma: A Review” in The Collected Essays of Ralph Ellison ed. 
John Callahan (New York: Modern Library, 1995): 339.  Gunnar Myrdal, An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Pantheon, 1944).  It appears 
that Ellison misquoted this passage from his notes, though he does not misrepresent the gist of 
Myrdal's argument.  Ellison’s quotation appears to be a paraphrase of one or more of the 
following passages: (1) "History is never irredeemable, and there is still time to come to good 
terms with colored peoples.  Their race pride and race prejudice is still mostly a defensive mental 
device, a secondary reaction built up to meet the humiliations of white supremacy" (1018), (2) 
"The voluntary withdrawal and the self-imposed segregation were shown to be a secondary 
reaction to a primary white pressure" (669 n.1), or (3) "Negro thinking is almost completely 
determined by white opinions—negatively and positively.  It develops as an answer to the 
popular theories prevalent among whites by which they rationalize their upholding of caste.  In 
this sense it is a derivative, or secondary, thinking.  The Negroes do not formulate the issues to 
be debated; these are set for them by the dominant group" (784).  It would seem that the variety 
of similar statements throughout Myrdal’s work serve to underscore the centrality of this idea of 
a “secondary reaction” to Myrdal’s methodology. 
15 Myrdal, An American Dilemma, 781-6. Singh’s account of Myrdal’s representations of 
African American politics agrees with Ellison’s impression of the work: “In the end, Myrdal 
denied the autonomous capacity of black people as individuals and as a collectivity (even as 
humans) to formulate a coherent, public standpoint on the social and political realities of 
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“one-dimensional proclamations of black human agency against one-dimensional social-
scientific denials of such agency” (57).  I claim that, by reading his work on sociology in 
conjunction with his fiction, it is clear that Ellison takes puts a great deal of thought into how 
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conclusion.    
22 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New 
York: Harper, 1962), esp  ¶14, and also Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on 
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25 Mark Seltzer, Bodies and Machines (New York: Routledge, 1992), 100. 
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African Americans, in Invisible Man and Spike Lee’s Bamboozled, where he concludes that 
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humans were reduced to things (however incomplete that reduction)” (207).  In considering 
Ellison’s novel as an “elaborate organization of both plot and character as a series of object-
relations” (202), Brown enables a particularly productive approach to the novel.  I would 
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bureaucratic, and state institutions, of the African American as a product of the Negro problem. 
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explicitly framed as a piece of entertainment for white audience (IM, 26). Through this parallel, 
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